...but everyone does it, though seldom as well.
I don't really have a television, or to be more accurate, my television has neither an antenna, a cable connection, or a satellite hookup, so it was not until last night that I saw an ad for the Sweeney Todd movie.
We did Sweeney in high school - Stephen Sondheim's version from 1979, and I expect that the movie is based on this musical, though of course the story of Fleet Street's demon barber dates back at least to the late 1800s. In college I found a straight play version from - the 1920's, I think. It was wretched, with improbable language and no real reason given, or even speculated upon, for Sweeney's actions. I caught the Circle in the Square production in the 90s, though I missed last year's Broadway production.
For those unfamiliar with Sondheim, I should state here that he does not write ordinary musicals. There is no fluff here; this is not Anything Goes. There is real substance here, and the Sweeney is more thriller or horror than anything else. The back story, as I mentioned, is also compelling.
I'm also curious to see what Depp does with the role. Needless to say, I'll be seeing this movie, and I'll write more once I do.
Thursday, November 29, 2007
Wednesday, November 28, 2007
Re: your mail
I used to be kind of embarrassed about the amount of email, much of it unread, in my email inbox. Then I read this article in the online Wall Street Journal, having been directed to it from this blog entry. Knowing that I'm not alone makes things a little better (I rejoiced when the school said it would delete all email older than 3 months from their servers this past summer. Unfortunately, they haven't made good on their promise).
Part of the email problem, it seems, has to do with too many people emailing out "free brownies in the kitchen" emails. But a lot of it has to do with indiscriminate use of "Reply to All". Last year someone forwarded a message to a previously little-known listserve here at the school, and everyone responding to it felt obliged to Respond to All, generating 20 or 30 emails regarding whatever the original message was about. People who found themselves on this email list now had 20 or 30 extra, unwanted email messages, and wanted off of the listserve - "Please take me off this list" they wrote, and hit "Reply to All". This, of course, generated more email in everyone's inboxes, prompting more "Get me off this list" email, and eventually the "get me off this list" emails outnumbered the original messages by at least three to one. By the end of the day IT had shut down the listserve for the weekend. When they restarted it Monday morning, several more "get me off this list" emails appeared before the whole thing finally died out.
Now, the school does provide a spam blocker with their email service, but that only catches email that is either flagrantly spam or comes from the company that holds my student loans. All of the friendly fire slips through. My solution is to sort directly from the inbox to the trash: "reminder - talk on psychoceramics of middle europe", trash; "sublet available", trash; "For sale", trash; "[No Subject]", trash. "For Sale" deserves special note. It looks helpful, on its surface - "ah, this person is selling something. Is there anything that I want?" Trouble is, there are things that I want - a new printer, a '73 Pacer in lime green; but I have no idea if this person is selling them. "Car for sale," or better yet, "1973 lime green Pacer for sale" would be more helpful.
Part of the email problem, it seems, has to do with too many people emailing out "free brownies in the kitchen" emails. But a lot of it has to do with indiscriminate use of "Reply to All". Last year someone forwarded a message to a previously little-known listserve here at the school, and everyone responding to it felt obliged to Respond to All, generating 20 or 30 emails regarding whatever the original message was about. People who found themselves on this email list now had 20 or 30 extra, unwanted email messages, and wanted off of the listserve - "Please take me off this list" they wrote, and hit "Reply to All". This, of course, generated more email in everyone's inboxes, prompting more "Get me off this list" email, and eventually the "get me off this list" emails outnumbered the original messages by at least three to one. By the end of the day IT had shut down the listserve for the weekend. When they restarted it Monday morning, several more "get me off this list" emails appeared before the whole thing finally died out.
Now, the school does provide a spam blocker with their email service, but that only catches email that is either flagrantly spam or comes from the company that holds my student loans. All of the friendly fire slips through. My solution is to sort directly from the inbox to the trash: "reminder - talk on psychoceramics of middle europe", trash; "sublet available", trash; "For sale", trash; "[No Subject]", trash. "For Sale" deserves special note. It looks helpful, on its surface - "ah, this person is selling something. Is there anything that I want?" Trouble is, there are things that I want - a new printer, a '73 Pacer in lime green; but I have no idea if this person is selling them. "Car for sale," or better yet, "1973 lime green Pacer for sale" would be more helpful.
Monday, November 26, 2007
Why the ambulance crew doesn't wear their seatbelts
This is another one on risk:
It used to strike me as strange that EMTs and paramedics typically don't wear their seatbelts. I don't mean in the back of the ambulance during a call. It's hard to be belted in and still treat the patient (though there are some harness systems designed to meet this purpose). But up front, or in the back when there's no patient (say, on the way to a call) - no seatbelt. I have also seen a lot of orthopedic surgeons who ride motorcycles, and almost every respiratory tech that I've ever met smokes.
My theory on this? I think that these people are brought face to face with human misery, and with the frailty of the human body, much more often than is healthy. Eventually, one of two things happens. Either they recognize those human frailties in themselves, and either change careers or go mad with it; or they decide that they're immune. "I won't get COPD or lung cancer from cigarettes, and I'll prove it by smoking them and not getting sick." "My body is not fragile, and I'll prove it by riding a motorcycle, not wearing my seatbelt, etc." "I'm too good a driver to get in an accident," etc, etc. "I am imune."
Which brings me to another point. If I'm putting on my seatbelt when I get into your car, don't be offended. It isn't necessarily your driving that I'm worried about. It's every other driver on the road.
Or be offended, if you want. Because maybe it is your driving that I'm worried about.
[Risk link added 28 Nov 2007]
It used to strike me as strange that EMTs and paramedics typically don't wear their seatbelts. I don't mean in the back of the ambulance during a call. It's hard to be belted in and still treat the patient (though there are some harness systems designed to meet this purpose). But up front, or in the back when there's no patient (say, on the way to a call) - no seatbelt. I have also seen a lot of orthopedic surgeons who ride motorcycles, and almost every respiratory tech that I've ever met smokes.
My theory on this? I think that these people are brought face to face with human misery, and with the frailty of the human body, much more often than is healthy. Eventually, one of two things happens. Either they recognize those human frailties in themselves, and either change careers or go mad with it; or they decide that they're immune. "I won't get COPD or lung cancer from cigarettes, and I'll prove it by smoking them and not getting sick." "My body is not fragile, and I'll prove it by riding a motorcycle, not wearing my seatbelt, etc." "I'm too good a driver to get in an accident," etc, etc. "I am imune."
Which brings me to another point. If I'm putting on my seatbelt when I get into your car, don't be offended. It isn't necessarily your driving that I'm worried about. It's every other driver on the road.
Or be offended, if you want. Because maybe it is your driving that I'm worried about.
[Risk link added 28 Nov 2007]
It's all in my head
The thing about depression - well, one thing about depression - is that it saps the patient of the desire for a cure. It's a sort of psychological cancer that causes a slow inward collapse. And for me the implosion often seems to coincide with the end of the semester, when I really need to be productive, and productive in very specific projects, if I want to pass.
The comparison to cancer is particularly apt as psychologocal illness is now where cancer was perhaps 20 years ago. Some of you may recall that we didn't used to talk about cancer; it just wasn't discussed. We've moved past that, as a society, where cancer is concerned, but we're not there yet on psychologocal illness.
Of course, of course, it's all in my head, though...
Q: What did the doctor tell the patient who had brain cancer?
A: "Don't worry, it's all in your head."
The comparison to cancer is particularly apt as psychologocal illness is now where cancer was perhaps 20 years ago. Some of you may recall that we didn't used to talk about cancer; it just wasn't discussed. We've moved past that, as a society, where cancer is concerned, but we're not there yet on psychologocal illness.
Of course, of course, it's all in my head, though...
Q: What did the doctor tell the patient who had brain cancer?
A: "Don't worry, it's all in your head."
Thursday, November 15, 2007
Please stand by...
I'm emerging from my two week funk, but now it's time for final papers, exams, etc. So, a quick update:
Cats: still getting bigger. Scruffy is more trusting, though it's still an issue. Presently he's stretched out with his sister on my old school bag, which is impressive, given how exposed a position that is. Shadow seems frustrated at the lack of spiders and crickets in the apartment - she's eaten them all and it takes time for them to respawn. She also destroyed another dangling feather toy thing, so I'll have to find another one.
Practicum: still not done
Thesis: have a meeting with my advisor tomorrow (Friday)
Katrina: Bush shares some of the responsibility at the local level, too, basically because he encouraged government at all levels to abandon their non-terrorism disaster prepredness preparedness work. Eventually I'll get around to writing about that in some more detail.
Cold weather: sucks
Things should be back to normal fairly soon; please continue to tune in.
- B
Cats: still getting bigger. Scruffy is more trusting, though it's still an issue. Presently he's stretched out with his sister on my old school bag, which is impressive, given how exposed a position that is. Shadow seems frustrated at the lack of spiders and crickets in the apartment - she's eaten them all and it takes time for them to respawn. She also destroyed another dangling feather toy thing, so I'll have to find another one.
Practicum: still not done
Thesis: have a meeting with my advisor tomorrow (Friday)
Katrina: Bush shares some of the responsibility at the local level, too, basically because he encouraged government at all levels to abandon their non-terrorism disaster prepredness preparedness work. Eventually I'll get around to writing about that in some more detail.
Cold weather: sucks
Things should be back to normal fairly soon; please continue to tune in.
- B
Monday, November 5, 2007
How the Bush II administration manufactured the disaster in New Orleans, Part II: the federal response
[What follows is an excerpt from a study I wrote on the Katrina debacle; I'll make the references more useful once I can figure out how to do it without driving myself nuts - B]
Perhaps the most obvious problem with the federal response was that it took too long to start in earnest, and thus too long to become effective. Michael Chertoff, the Secretary for the Department of Homeland Security and the person who, by virtue of his title, is responsible for organizing the federal response to nationally-significant disasters, apparently failed to appreciate the magnitude of the disaster, in spite of FEMA (as well as other Washington officials, the Governors of Louisiana and Mississippi, and the Mayor of New Orleans) having been provided with strikingly accurate predictions of Katrina’s path and strength by the National Weather Service at least two days in advance. Similarly, New Orleans’s vulnerability to flooding has long been known - reports of flooding in that city due to Hurricane Betsy (1965) read like a first draft of the flooding reports generated after Katrina. More recently, federal, state, and local officials and emergency managers convened in 2004 to participate in a disaster drill in which a fictional Hurricane Pam was said to have caused massive flooding in New Orleans, trapping many residents and overwhelming local response capabilities. Reports generated by the Hurricane Pam exercise were yet to be released when Katrina hit, but the general conclusion that an event of this sort would require government at all levels to respond in a coordinated, well planned fashion was startlingly clear.
The potential for disaster was therefor obvious to anyone who was looking, and emergency managers should be looking: hazard and vulnerability analyses form the basis of successful emergency management. What is more, once Katrina crossed Florida, it was likely to hit somewhere on the country’s Gulf Coast, with devastating effects when it did. Secretary of Homeland Security Chertoff might be able to claim that he didn’t know that New Orleans, Louisiana, or Mississippi would be hit, but he can’t claim that he didn’t know that his agency would need to respond to somewhere on the Gulf Coast in order to clean up after Katrina. {{16 Berger, Eric 2001;21 McQuaid, John 2002; 14 McQuaid, John 2002; 18 Schleifstein, Mark 2002; 20 Schleifstein, Mark 2002; 15 Schleifstein, Mark 2002; 17 Haddow, George D. 2006; 7 Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina 2006; 36 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 2006; }}
Secretary Chertoff’s initial lack of action is all the more puzzling in that President Bush declared states of emergency, at the requests of their respective governors, for Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi. Since this declaration activates the federal response to a disaster (anticipated or actual), it is peculiar that Secretary Chertoff, whose department was responsible for coordinating that federal response, failed to take decisive action subsequent to its being issued. In the words of the Report of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Secretary Chertoff “made only top-level inquiries into the state of preparations, and accepted uncritically the reassurances he received. He did not appear to reach out to the other Cabinet Secretaries to make sure that they were readying their departments to provide whatever assistance DHS – and the people of the Gulf – might need.” (report page 7){{36 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 2006; }} At first glance, one might suppose that this was because he believed that his subordinate, FEMA Director Michael Brown, was handling preparations. But a memo signed by Secretary Chertoff, and dated 30 August – a day after Katrina collided with the Gulf Coast, undermines this argument. In the memo, Chertoff appoints Director Brown the Principal Federal Official for the federal response to Katrina. In the same memo, Chertoff refers to the President Bush’s White House Task Force on Hurricane Katrina Response, and indicates that not only will DHS be a part of this task force, but it will “assist the [President’s] administration with its response to Hurricane Katrina.”{{12 Chertoff, Michael 2005; }} This raises several questions, among them why did Secretary Chertoff wait until after Katrina hit to assign Director Brown to lead the federal response, and why was DHS assisting the President's response? It should have been leading the response.
[End of excerpt]
Here is an interesting clip from 2006 in which President Bush takes "full responsibility" for the failure of the federal response to Katrina.
prologue: the Clinton Administration
Chapter I: Dismantling FEMA
Perhaps the most obvious problem with the federal response was that it took too long to start in earnest, and thus too long to become effective. Michael Chertoff, the Secretary for the Department of Homeland Security and the person who, by virtue of his title, is responsible for organizing the federal response to nationally-significant disasters, apparently failed to appreciate the magnitude of the disaster, in spite of FEMA (as well as other Washington officials, the Governors of Louisiana and Mississippi, and the Mayor of New Orleans) having been provided with strikingly accurate predictions of Katrina’s path and strength by the National Weather Service at least two days in advance. Similarly, New Orleans’s vulnerability to flooding has long been known - reports of flooding in that city due to Hurricane Betsy (1965) read like a first draft of the flooding reports generated after Katrina. More recently, federal, state, and local officials and emergency managers convened in 2004 to participate in a disaster drill in which a fictional Hurricane Pam was said to have caused massive flooding in New Orleans, trapping many residents and overwhelming local response capabilities. Reports generated by the Hurricane Pam exercise were yet to be released when Katrina hit, but the general conclusion that an event of this sort would require government at all levels to respond in a coordinated, well planned fashion was startlingly clear.
The potential for disaster was therefor obvious to anyone who was looking, and emergency managers should be looking: hazard and vulnerability analyses form the basis of successful emergency management. What is more, once Katrina crossed Florida, it was likely to hit somewhere on the country’s Gulf Coast, with devastating effects when it did. Secretary of Homeland Security Chertoff might be able to claim that he didn’t know that New Orleans, Louisiana, or Mississippi would be hit, but he can’t claim that he didn’t know that his agency would need to respond to somewhere on the Gulf Coast in order to clean up after Katrina. {{16 Berger, Eric 2001;21 McQuaid, John 2002; 14 McQuaid, John 2002; 18 Schleifstein, Mark 2002; 20 Schleifstein, Mark 2002; 15 Schleifstein, Mark 2002; 17 Haddow, George D. 2006; 7 Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina 2006; 36 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 2006; }}
Secretary Chertoff’s initial lack of action is all the more puzzling in that President Bush declared states of emergency, at the requests of their respective governors, for Louisiana, Alabama, and Mississippi. Since this declaration activates the federal response to a disaster (anticipated or actual), it is peculiar that Secretary Chertoff, whose department was responsible for coordinating that federal response, failed to take decisive action subsequent to its being issued. In the words of the Report of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Secretary Chertoff “made only top-level inquiries into the state of preparations, and accepted uncritically the reassurances he received. He did not appear to reach out to the other Cabinet Secretaries to make sure that they were readying their departments to provide whatever assistance DHS – and the people of the Gulf – might need.” (report page 7){{36 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 2006; }} At first glance, one might suppose that this was because he believed that his subordinate, FEMA Director Michael Brown, was handling preparations. But a memo signed by Secretary Chertoff, and dated 30 August – a day after Katrina collided with the Gulf Coast, undermines this argument. In the memo, Chertoff appoints Director Brown the Principal Federal Official for the federal response to Katrina. In the same memo, Chertoff refers to the President Bush’s White House Task Force on Hurricane Katrina Response, and indicates that not only will DHS be a part of this task force, but it will “assist the [President’s] administration with its response to Hurricane Katrina.”{{12 Chertoff, Michael 2005; }} This raises several questions, among them why did Secretary Chertoff wait until after Katrina hit to assign Director Brown to lead the federal response, and why was DHS assisting the President's response? It should have been leading the response.
[End of excerpt]
Here is an interesting clip from 2006 in which President Bush takes "full responsibility" for the failure of the federal response to Katrina.
prologue: the Clinton Administration
Chapter I: Dismantling FEMA
Sunday, November 4, 2007
FEMA trailers making inhabitants sick
I do want to quickly comment on this, though, as I just found it on line. Two years after the event, many victims of Hurricane Katrina are still living in FEMA trailers. Worse, it appears that the trailers are giving off formaldehyde, which is making their residents sick. This past summer, newspapers as far away as Canada reported on this issue (Consider the (Montreal) Gazette, on 28 August, p A15), and it appears that at least one lawsuit has been filed.
What this illustrates, among other things, is a lack of necessary planing on the part of FEMA and other agencies. It appears that the formaldehyde is in part related to the speed with which the trailers were constructed and put into use, as whatever trailers that might have been available at the time were inadequate in numbers or quality (you probably remember the difficulty that many people had in getting trailers - there just didn't seem to be enough of them - from your morning paper or evening newscast).
Ok - I'm at my limit for the moment. More complaining tomorrow.
What this illustrates, among other things, is a lack of necessary planing on the part of FEMA and other agencies. It appears that the formaldehyde is in part related to the speed with which the trailers were constructed and put into use, as whatever trailers that might have been available at the time were inadequate in numbers or quality (you probably remember the difficulty that many people had in getting trailers - there just didn't seem to be enough of them - from your morning paper or evening newscast).
Ok - I'm at my limit for the moment. More complaining tomorrow.
OK, I've been off for a few days
Usually, I'm able to update daily, or even a few times a day, but it's been a difficult week. No motivation. None. But I feel some motivation coming on, in the not too distant future...
Oh, Shadow caught a cricket the night before last. Once I had brought it to her attention, it hopped once, and she hopped once, and that was about it for the cricket. Last year when it got cold I had something of an invasion of crickets, but I haven't seen any more this year. I suppose that after their scout failed to return, they decided to seek warmth elsewhere.
Oh, Shadow caught a cricket the night before last. Once I had brought it to her attention, it hopped once, and she hopped once, and that was about it for the cricket. Last year when it got cold I had something of an invasion of crickets, but I haven't seen any more this year. I suppose that after their scout failed to return, they decided to seek warmth elsewhere.
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